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CONSIDERATION OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD B. CHENEY TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MARCH 16, 1989.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. NUNN, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

The Committee on Armed Services, having had under consideration the nomination of the Honorable Richard B. Cheney to be Secretary of Defense, reports favorably thereon and recommends the nomination be confirmed by the Senate.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On March 10, 1989, President Bush announced his intent to nominate Representative Cheney to be Secretary of Defense. The Senate received Representative Cheney's nomination on March 14. The Committee held a public hearing with Representative Cheney on March 14. The Committee met in executive session with Representative Cheney on March 15. In a public session on March 16, the Committee voted unanimously to report the nomination favorably with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed by the Senate.

SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE'S REVIEW OF REPRESENTATIVE CHENEY'S NOMINATION

1. COMMITTEE PROCEDURES

During the 100th Congress, the Committee initiated new procedures for consideration of nominations for civilian appointed positions in the Department of Defense. In addition, the Committee adopted standards to guide its consideration of the qualifications of

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nominees. The Committee applied these procedures and standards during consideration of Representative Cheney's nomination.

E. REVIEW OF REQUIRED SUBMISSIONS BY THE NOMINEE AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

a. Committee questionnaire

The Committee requires each nominee to complete a questionnaire relating to the nominee's qualifications and potential conflicts of interest. Representative Cheney's response to the Committee's questionnaire, received on March 13, provided basic biographical and financial information and served as the starting point for the Committee's inquiry into Representative Cheney's qualifications and suitability for the position of Secretary of Defense. A biographical sketch of Representative Cheney is presented as Appendix 2 of this report.

b. Financial disclosure and background materials

As part of the confirmation process, the Committee obtained Representative Cheney's financial disclosure forms for the last ten years and his tax records for the last three years. The Committee also received the letters on conflict of interest and related matters required of the nominee, the Office of Government Ethics, and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. The Committee concludes that the nominee is in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations governing conflict of interest.

c. FBI summary memorandum on the background investigation of Representative Cheney

On March 15, the White House provided the Committee with the summary memorandum on the background investigation of the nominee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This document was reviewed by the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, who briefed the Committee in executive session. The Committee also received the required letter from the Counsel to the President outlining the nature and scope of the FBI background investigation. The Committee concludes that there is nothing in Representative Cheney's background, as reflected in the FBI investigation, that would render him unfit to serve as Secretary of Defense.

d. Medical condition

The Committee received a letter, presented as Appendix 3 to this report, from Representative Cheney's physician concerning his medical condition, particularly concerning his recovery from coronary bypass surgery in the summer of 1988. This letter indicates that Representative Cheney's "recovery has been excellent and he has been advised to pursue unrestricted professional and recreational objectives" and that "[t]he Congressman is presently fit to accept any position requiring the highest intellectual behavior and physical performance." At the Committee's request, more detailed information on Representative Cheney's medical condition was also provided by his physician. In addition, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, after receiving the nominee's permission, reviewed the medical information with other physicians and briefed

the Committee in executive session on their findings. The Committee also discussed Representative Cheney's medical condition in both public and executive sessions. The Committee concludes that there is no medical reason that would preclude Representative Cheney from serving as Secretary of Defense.

3. COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS

On March 14, 1989, President Bush formally submitted to the Senate the nomination of the Honorable Richard B. Cheney to be Secretary of Defense, which was referred to the Committee on that date. The Committee met in public session on March 14 to receive testimony from Representative Cheney on national security policy issues. The nominee's views on major national security issues, based on this testimony, are presented in Appendix 1 of this report. On March 15, the Committee met with the nominee in executive session to examine confidential financial and other matters. On March 16, the Committee completed its deliberations on the nomination in a public session.

QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE CHENEY

1. ROLES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of Defense is the head of, and has authority, direction, and control over, the Department of Defense. He also is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. In these capacities, the Secretary has four principal roles: policymaker, manager, commander, and leader.

The Secretary of Defense has a major policymaking role. He is a statutory member of the National Security Council. The Secretary of Defense advises the President on, and manages for him, the military aspects of national security strategy and policy. He plays the lead role in formulating military strategy and policy. Given the complexity of the international security environment, the breadth of U.S. global and regional security interests, and the widely varied missions of U.S. military forces, the policymaking role of the Secretary of Defense is a formidable one, and he must be skilled in both strategic and policy planning.

The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the largest and most complex organization in the Free World, has an important managerial role. The Department of Defense's annual budget of $300 billion is equal to the total sales of the four largest U.S. industrial corporations: General Motors, Exxon, Ford Motor, and IBM. The workforce of 2-million, active-duty, military personnel and 1-million civilian personnel in the Department of Defense is greater than the combined workforce of the 14 largest U.S. industrial corporations. The task of managing the Department of Defense is an enormous one without parallel in American business.

The Secretary of Defense is also in the chain of command for military operations, which runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified combatant commanders in the field. The President and the Secretary of Defense constitute what is termed the "National Command Authorities" for U.S. military forces and nuclear weapons.

Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Despite his civilian status, the Secretary's powers and authority make him a commander.

Closely related to, but distinct from, the Secretary of Defense's roles as a manager and commander is his role as a leader. In addition to managing and commanding, the Secretary of Defense must be able to inspire and to effectively influence the behavior of his subordinates. Effective leadership is critical in the Department of Defense.

2. COMMITTEE'S EVALUATION OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE CHENEY

The Committee determined that Representative Cheney is highly qualified to serve as Secretary of Defense. Representative Cheney has had a distinguished, 20-year public career, serving in senior leadership positions in both the Legislative and Executive Branches. Beyond his leadership and management experience, Representative Cheney has substantial expertise on national security and intelligence issues. The Committee also determined that Representative Cheney's high standards of personal conduct and integrity would help to restore public confidence in the integrity of defense management.

A comparison of the qualifications of Representative Cheney with the standards endorsed by the Committee indicate the following:

Standard No. 1. *Nominees must be of unquestionable integrity.* The Committee's inquiry revealed no evidence that would question Representative Cheney's integrity. Indeed, throughout his public career, Representative Cheney has exhibited the highest standards of integrity and honor.

Standard No. 2. *Nominees must be capable of performing as members of the Secretary of Defense's management team.* This standard applies to the senior subordinates of the Secretary of Defense, and thus is not a consideration in evaluating the nominee for Secretary of Defense. The Committee did appreciate the understanding of, and commitment to, the concept of a strong defense management team that Representative Cheney demonstrated during his confirmation hearings.

Standard No. 3. *Nominees should have a substantial understanding of national security policy and international security affairs.* Representative Cheney meets this standard. His service as White House Chief of Staff and as a 6-term Member of the House of Representatives have provided Representative Cheney with a solid background on national and international security issues. His service on the House Select Committee on Intelligence and on the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Deals with Iran further strengthen his background. Moreover, Representative Cheney has been a frequent and valuable contributor in academic fora to studies of security and foreign policy issues.

Standard No. 4. *Nominees must demonstrate a commitment to emphasizing overall national security goals and objectives.* During his congressional career, Representative Cheney has repeatedly em-

phasized the use of overall national security goals and objectives as the yardstick by which various security issues and proposals should be measured. Representative Cheney has demonstrated an understanding of, and appreciation for, U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy component.

Standard No. 5. *Nominees must have substantial experience and expertise within their proposed areas of responsibility.* Representative Cheney has the requisite experience and expertise for the traditional role of the Secretary of Defense with its policymaking and external affairs orientation.

Standard No. 6. *Nominees must be capable managers and administrators.* Although Representative Cheney has not had extensive corporate management experience, his service in numerous leadership positions, particularly as White House Chief of Staff for President Ford, has provided useful experience in management and administration.

Standard No. 7. *Nominees must be suited by temperament for the demands of defense management.* Representative Cheney has worked effectively in complex and demanding environments similar to that of the Department of Defense, such as his service as White House Chief of Staff for President Ford.

Standard No. 8. *Nominees must have a strong commitment to public service.* Nearly all of Representative Cheney's adult life has been committed to public service.

Standard No. 9. *Nominees must demonstrate an understanding of, and respect for, the Constitutional principles of the Nation, including the legitimate role of the Congress.* Representative Cheney's academic training and public service have provided a firsthand knowledge of Constitutional principles. Moreover, given his long service in the House of Representatives, Representative Cheney will bring to the position of Secretary of Defense a solid understanding of the legitimate role of the Congress.

Conclusion

On March 16, 1989, by a vote of 20–0, the Committee on Armed Services approved a motion to report favorably the nomination of the Honorable Richard B. Cheney to be Secretary of Defense with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed by the Senate.

APPENDIX 1: REPRESENTATIVE CHENEY'S VIEWS ON MAJOR NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

During a public hearing, the Committee questioned Representative Cheney on a wide variety of important national security issues. Representative Cheney's views on major issues are summarized below using direct quotes from his unedited testimony.

DEFENSE BUDGET

I would hope that while we obviously have to respond to the budget realities we are faced with that we not fall into the trap of assuming that only budget considerations should drive our decisions and choices about force levels, force structure, and procurement and those other important items within the overall defense budget.

I would like to be able to come back to the Committee and say, look, here is the strategy we decided upon in order to achieve the national goals and objectives that we all share, and I can carry out this strategy but it is going to cost X amount or these are the choices and tradeoffs you as a Congress are going to have to make.

Clearly my responsibility is to advise the President, and I will. His responsibility is making a submission to the Congress, but in the final analysis I would hope Congress is willing to look not only at the budget situation but also look at the question of what do we need by way of military capability in order to achieve our objectives.

BUDGET REVIEW

My own preference, speaking from the perspective of the Defense Department, would be for a two-year [defense budget] amendment.

In my discussions yesterday at the department, there is some desire to try to postpone that [submission of a defense budget amendment] a few days if possible. Obviously if that [April 9] is the deadline that the President wants to insist upon, we will pursue it. It is my intention to look at that as soon as I can complete this confirmation process and how it fits with everything else we are trying to do.

I think there ought to be some relationship with respect to what we do in our budget development as well as the strategic plan.

GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS SEQUESTER

I too would be concerned about a sequester. I think we ought to try to avoid a sequester at all costs, because of course the way the formula currently works, half of the se-

questered funds would come out of the Department of Defense, and that would be a hit, if you will, that would be extremely difficult to accept and to implement, especially in light of the fact that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill requires those reductions to be made in terms of outlays.

I would urge as strongly as possible both my colleagues in the administration and my former colleagues in the Congress to try to reach some kind of an accord so that we can in fact avoid a sequester later this year.

LONG-RANGE FISCAL PLANNING

* * * the notion of trying to extend the period of time for which we budget and to try to do some reasonable long-range [fiscal planning] is absolutely crucial.

And I do think it is a two-way street. I think there is an obligation, if you will, on the part of the Executive to share as much information as possible with the Congress. Sometimes they do not have the information requested, but to the extent they do, certainly they should share it so that Congress is aware of the consequences of various decisions that might be made.

By the same token, it is possible I think for Congress to make it easier for the Executive to be able to do that if we have some degree of stability in terms of at least the top line with respect to what we are going to spend in the national security and the defense area.

PACKARD COMMISSION AND GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT REFORMS

We have a mandate from the president to implement the recommendations of the Packard Commission.

I do not currently know what the status is of the [Packard Commission] reforms inside the Department. I know that an aggressive effort is under way to respond to the president's request, and certainly it would be my intention, should I be confirmed by the Senate, to move as rapidly as possible to carry out that instruction.

I personally believe the Goldwater-Nichols [Act] approach is an excellent one. I supported it, as a Member in the House of Representatives, and would look to it as something that obviously I would have an obligation to carry out as secretary of defense.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT REFORMS

* * * I think we will find, Mr. Chairman, that in the years ahead, especially if current trends continue, that is to say if we see a lessened Soviet threat, that increasingly our military requirements are going to be influenced by the need to deal with conflicts in the Third World, to deal with low-intensity conflict, as you have stated.

I think it is important that the Department be organized to deal with those kinds of issues. I think the provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols bill ought to be implemented, with respect to the establishment of the assistant secretary [of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict].

I realize it has been something of a controversial issue with prior administrations, but certainly it is the law of the land, and I would take that as a mandate in terms of how I operated.

PROCUREMENT REFORMS

I am aware that the question of the power and authority of the Under Secretary for Acquisition was an important one with respect to the deliberations on the Goldwater-Nichols bill. I believe firmly in the proposition that we have got to do a lot more than we have in the past.

It would be my intention to seek the most qualified individual I can be connection with the Warner-Nunn letter [on qualifications standards for defense political appointees] that we have seen earlier in terms of laying out requirements with respect to the kinds of people that ought to be retained. I think that [Under Secretary for Acquisition] is one of the three or four most important jobs in the Department, and it would be my intention to find the most qualified individual possible and give him the authority to do the job that has to be done.

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT TEAM

* * * my first priority, Mr. Chairman is obviously personnel [appointments].

* * * the decisions that the Department will make in the years ahead will be directly affected by the quality of the people that we are able to bring on board at the beginning of this administration.

It may well be that the most important decisions I make as Secretary during my four years, should I be confirmed, will be the decisons in the next few weeks about who I hire and who I ask to take on specific jobs and assignments.

I thought that the letter that Chairman Nuun and Senator Warner produced last fall that laid out a series of criteria that they would like to see met is a very good starting point.

* * * I am a great believer as a manager that the personnel decisions you make are absolutely crucial. There is very little that I will be able to do over in that Department all by myself. It is going to be organizing and motivating and providing leadership for a team hopefully of first-class people who will be able to carry out the policies of the President and the policies of the Congress with respect to national security matters.

It may well be that the decisions that I make over the next few weeks in terms of who goes into those particular positions will have a bigger impact on the Department than anything else I do during my service as Secretary, so I have that as my number one priority.

ROLES AND MISSIONS

With respect to roles and mission, I couldn't agree more. I think you have touched on a key item that I would hope will be addressed by the Department and the Administration as a result of the on-going review as we look at strategy and our national objectives and our capacity to carry out that strategy.

I certainly plan to spend time asking questions about those areas. It is an area that I need to know a lot more about myself. The capacity to compare capabilities across services and look at how we might meet various requirements is something I would like to spend a lot of time on.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

* * * I have, as you indicated, been a strong supporter of the Strategic Defense Initiative. I have consistently voted for it when it was on the floor of the House. As a member of the House Intelligence Committee, I have been involved, because we have jurisdiction over a portion of the program. So I think my record on SDI is very clear.

I do believe that it has been a major contribution in recent years to encourage the Soviets in the arms control arena. I think they have great concerns about our technological capabilities.

I think SDI has significant merit, in part, because it plays to our great strength our technological capabilities, our capacity to develop and deploy such a system.

At this point, of course, we are only part way through the process that President Reagan set out for us when we indicated we were going to work aggressively to research, and having researched and developed the concepts, that we would then, at some point, make a decision about deployment, about what kind of system we would deploy, when, and how it would relate to our other strategic systems.

We are now in the midst of two reviews that have major ramifications for SDI just as it does for all other systems. And one of those is the strategic review that is underway in the Department, and the other is the review with respect to the budget situation.

I would hope that I would not be an uncritical advocate of any system as Secretary of Defense. I think I would have an obligation to look at the pros and cons on every system before making recommendations to the President or to the Congress as to what is required.

Certainly, I believe that SDI is a very good, very sound concept. I think it would add significantly to deterrence. I

think it offers the prospect of adding a defensive component to our deterrent capability and for those reasons alone ought to be pursued.

At what level of funding? At this point, that is an open question, just as is the question that Senator Kennedy raised about the 15th carrier group and about the questions Senator McCain and others have raised about force structure and readiness and procurement and so forth.

The bottom line is we cannot buy everything we would like to buy unless we have a lot more money than we have today. * * *

ICBM MODERNIZATION

* * * I am on record in the past as being a very strong supporter of both rail garrison [MX] and the small ICBM. I think there is considerable merits to our trying to develop both those systems.

Obviously, we are in a situation where, for budgetary reasons, we may have to make some very hard choices in this area. I would like to think I approach it without any preconceived notion about which way we ought to go until we have had the opportunity to complete the review that is now underway in the Department with respect to our strategic requirements, and also specifically on this issue of rail garrison [MX] versus the small ICBM.

I would hope that we will be able to arrive at a solution that is broadly supported in the Congress, and that we would undertake that decision only after there has been extensive consultation with the members of this committee.

I do [agree that we should go forward with a modernization of our land-based ICBM force], Senator. I think I have a bias in this area, not so much between the systems, but in favor of the notion that we must add the element of mobility to our land-based force. I think that is absolutely vital. I think we have, if you think back over the decade of the 1980s and where we were in 1979 and 1980, concerned about the vulnerability of our land-based force, we still have not really addressed that issue.

And the way we will do that ultimately will be with respect to the decision that we are about to make concerning modernization and the question of mobility.

So I think it is vital. I think it is essential. I think we ought go forward even though we are obviously, simultaneously in the midst of negotiations with the Soviets.

They have such a capability, they have deployed such a capability. I think it offers the prospect of increased stability, in terms of the force adds to our deterrent. And for that reason, I will be a strong advocate of mobility.

When I talk about the concept of mobility, I think specifically either rail garrison [MX] or the small ICBM would

offer a significant improvement, a significant degree of modernization over the existing force.

Obviously, they have different attributes and would bring different strengths to our forces. And under ideal circumstances, we would be able to proceed with both systems. Because of the budget situation, because of the ongoing review inside the Pentagon, I think that decision has to be looked at within the broader framework of those other considerations.

BOLT-OUT-OF-THE-BLUE ATTACK

As a general proposition, I believe that we do in fact have adequate early warning capabilities with respect to the possibility of an attack upon the United States, a strategic attack involving the strategic assets of the Soviet Union.

It is something we have to watch on a continuous basis. It is something we have invested a great deal of money in, the intelligence committee has over the years on behalf of the nation, and that the Congress has always very heavily supported.

But I personally think the odds of a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack are extremely remote; that as long as we maintain the viability of our Triad, as long as we move forward with improvements and modernization of our ICBM force, as long as we seek, for example, to add the element of mobility to our land-based ICBM force, I am confident we can maintain the capability so that the notion of a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack by an adversary would be something we do not have to be concerned about.

NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION

But obviously if the Soviets continue to pursue the notion of further reductions or withdrawals of theater nuclear weapons that is going to make it more difficult for the United States and for our allies to maintain the kind of political support that is required to do what is needed with respect to our own short-range [nuclear] systems in Europe, where I think modernization is in fact required.

LINKAGE OF ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE POLICIES

I think that for us to proceed into the arena of arms control, especially when we look at the complexity of such issues as agreements on conventional force reduction or START accords, that it is absolutely vital that the Defense Department and our military services be consulted thoroughly before proposals are put on the table.

And it would certainly be my intention, should I be confirmed by the committee and the Senate, to do everything in my power to see to it that that kind of advice is forthcoming to the President before he makes decisions with respect to our negotiating posture.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

I think like many observers I was surprised to some extent that the Soviet proposal seemed to be as close as what the NATO allies had put on the table. It would appear that at least on the surface anyway, and based on those preliminary indications, that the possibility exists that we could in fact move fairly aggressively towards some kind of an agreement.

But I think we should not underestimate the difficulty of the task. Counting missiles and silos is a relatively simple proposition, and those negotiations obviously have taken a lot of time, in some cases years, to put together.

When we begin to talk about what constitutes parity and would enhance security in terms of conventional forces in Europe and we take into account the important contribution our allies make and the necessity to consult widely in that arena I think it would be a mistake for us to underestimate the complexity of those negotiations.

But basically I have been generally impressed with what has transpired so far. * * *

BURDENSHARING

* * * I share your concern about burdensharing. I do think there are ample grounds for the notion that the United States for a long time has carried a larger [burden] than have our allies. I certainly would expect to work with the Committee and with the Congress, should I become Secretary, to try to generate, if you will, a more equitable sharing of those responsibilities.

I think, though, it is important to make a couple of other points. I would argue that we are most likely to be successful in terms of encouraging our allies to contribute more to the common defense if we approach it not on the basis of this is so that the United States can save money, but rather on the basis of this is what is required for our common defense and in light of your overall economic capability and performance your share should be X amount.

Now obviously we have had debates over the years about what constitutes burdensharing and different elements contributing to the defense. The Germans clearly contribute in ways that no one else does by virtue of being on the front line, having so many troops based on their soil, and dealing with the difficulties that stem from that.

But I would think that it is appropriate, especially at a time when other nations are growing relative to ours in terms of their overall national wealth, that we should continue to seek, as we have in the past, a greater contribution from our allies toward the common defense.

RESPONDING TO GORBACHEV

I do not believe we have reached the point in terms of developments in the Soviet Union that would allow us to

begin to save money, if you will, because of reform or changes inside the nation of our number one adversary.

I have * * * reached the point where I personally am persuaded that he [President Gorbachev] is indeed convinced that the status quo in the Soviet Union is unacceptable, and where he is committed to a policy of reform. * * *

But, having said that, I think it would be a grave mistake for us to assume at this point that it is appropriate for us to in any way reduce our own military capabilities or lessen our own defense posture.

I am frankly somewhat skeptical about the likelihood of his success in terms of his reform drive. * * *

I think that it is important for us to remember that he is the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That is his philosophy and his belief and his attitude.

And while certainly we ought to take advantage of every opportunity that the new era of good feeling, if you will, seems to present, certainly we ought to pursue an aggressive agenda with respect to the Soviet Union, we ought to seek arms control agreements where they are in our interest and where they improve security.

I think we have to be very cautious, I think there is a real danger in the West, the perception of change in the Soviet Union will exceed the reality of change in the Soviet Union.

But our allies in Europe and elsewhere around the world will find it very difficult to maintain the level of commitment in terms of resources because of domestic political pressures as they respond to this perception of a lessened threat from the Soviets.

And the final point, of course is there is always the possibility that Mr. Gorbachev will be replaced by someone who does not share his views or his commitment to reform, or who does not adopt his relatively non-threatening posture towards the West.

So I would see it as my responsibility, Senator, that in light of the current state of affairs, and certainly until such time as the president and the Congress were to agree that the time had arrived for us to reduce our military commitments, I do not believe that is possible at present, and I would argue strenuously against it.

I am basically inclined to believe that they [the Soviets] are sincere in seeking arms control agreements. They are tough bargainers. They always have been. But I think the successful completion of the INF accord last year, which I supported, is an indication that we clearly have made and continue to make progress.

Given the talks that are under way and recent proposals coming from the Soviet leadership with respect to conventional forces I believe that the opportunity exists, the pos-

sibility exists that we may well be able to reach further accords.

"HOLLOW" FORCES

* * * with respect to your concern over a hollow army or hollow forces. I remember those days. I first arrived in the Congress in 1979 as a freshman. And we found ourselves faced with a situation in which there were real doubts about the capacity of our military forces to perform when called upon because of the fact that we had let readiness, especially, erode over a period of time.

I think I have an obligation not to gloss over the reality of the tough choices that we are faced with, an obligation to say, look, if we get X amount of money, these are the commitments we are going to be able to support, and these are the forces we are going to be able to sustain, and to argue as strenuously as I know how that we not fall back into the trap that we did a decade ago, when we let budget considerations basically drive us into a situation where we had significantly less capable forces than we have today.

FORCE STRUCTURE

* * * if we are not faced with it this year, we will be as we put together the 1991 budget with the proposition that we will have to make a choice between the quality of our forces, the readiness and sustainability, our capacity to maintain levels of pay and benefits to attract top quality people versus force structure itself.

And from my standpoint, give a preference, * * * I think it is very important that we maintain the quality of those forces; that that is what we failed to do in the late 1970s, and that we should avoid making that kind of mistake again.

MARITIME SUPERIORITY AND 600-SHIP NAVY

I certainly do not know of any such diminution [of our worldwide commitments which would justify a carrier force reduction] at present, Senator. Obviously that is a subject that is under review in this ongoing strategic review. My experience where carriers are concerned has been that the first thing a President does when he gets into a crisis is ask where is the nearest carrier.

* * * I have consistently been a supporter of the 600-ship Navy. I felt it was a good and worthy goal and if you look at my voting record in the House of Representatives certainly it is consistent with that view.

I clearly do not disagree at all with the notion that you have mentioned in terms of the importance of the sea lanes of the United States.

DRUG INTERDICTION

The president yesterday held a session with the cabinet, and with Mr. Bennett, the new drug czar, at which he made it clear that he would like to have his administration officials, to the extent it is appropriate within the constraints of the statutes under which they operate, cooperate with Mr. Bennett in his efforts to coordinate national policy on this important issue.

I think the Defense Department does have assets and capabilities that are useful in terms of trying to interdict the illicit flow of drugs.

I think it is important, especially in a free society that values democracy and individual liberty and has respect for individual rights, that we not expect men and women who are trained to function in military units to simultaneously double as law enforcement officers capable of making arrests and safeguarding the rights of the accused, et cetera.

So it is a delicate balance that is called for. I would clearly as Secretary, should I be confirmed, carry out my responsibilities in accordance with existing statutes. Should there be a need to seek any kind of modification of those statutes, then certainly I will be back before the Committee.

* * * if I am confirmed as Secretary, it is my intention to do everything I can to carry out the statutes that apply to the Department. * * *

But, obviously, there are limits to what the Defense Department can do, in terms of trying to deal with the problem. I did, in the last Congress, generally vote to support an aggressive role with respect to trying to interdict drugs. * * *

I think it is important for the Secretary of Defense, given the mandate that I would hold were I confirmed, to carry out the duties and obligations of the Secretary of Defense.

You are not the drug czar, you are not the chief law enforcement officer of the land, you are there specifically to manage the Defense Department, to maintain combat capability, * * * and to deal with all those other issues that that entails.

To the extent that the President calls upon me to cooperate with the effort that Mr. Bennett is about to undertake, in terms of trying to coordinate activities in the drug area, I will obviously do everything I can to assist within the confines and the constraints that are given me as Secretary of Defense.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

[Can we have your pledge that you will give us everything [on the Base Closure Commission report] you can

honorably give us as Members of the Congress?] "Certainly, Senator."

Let me respond to your comments on base closing by indicating * * * that I will be happy to review that process should I be confirmed.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Any time we have the possibility of foreign ownership of a firm that has a major national security implication for the United States, that I would see it as my obligation to bring that to the attention of the President and to advise him accordingly.

* * * But, clearly, I share your concern that that is an area, that we have to be careful about. And that defense firms, firms that have applications for national security, have to be treated differently than would foreign acquisitions of other assets.

* * * as a general proposition I would prefer a situation in which we have a strong, vital, healthy private sector with the capability to produce the goods and the weapons that we need in order to maintain our military security. That is the ideal situation.

Obviously we are under a set of circumstances now where that is not always the case. I think we ought to look first to the kinds of practices we have within the Pentagon in terms of procurement and acquisition to see whether or not we are doing things by way of operating that make it difficult for the private sector to survive and be healthy.

I think there are, however, probably areas—you mentioned high definition television—that may well be one of them. I am not enough of an expert in the field to know at this point. There may well be areas like that where there are very special technological developments that require the Department of Defense to get actively involved in trying to support and sustain those industries.

We are, I think in some danger in some areas of not having an adequate defense industrial base to support the kinds of systems we are going to need and require in the future, and that is of great concern.

* * * Obviously some of our allies have capabilities, industrial capabilities, that we would like to have, and there may be occasions when the best way for us to meet a defense requirement would in fact be to contract with a company that is not a U.S. company.

But I think you have to look at them on a case-by-case basis. Thre are clearly areas where we do not want to encourage the development of technology in another area, but I do not think you can have a hard and fast rule. I think you would have to look at it and see what it is you were trying to achieve and what the best way is to achieve it.

* * * I think input [on technology transfer issues from agencies with a real focus on national economic implications] is certainly appropriate. I cannot argue with that. And obviously when you are dealing with significant economic packages or deals that involve sophisticated technology the President is going to want to draw on all those various folks for advice.

WAR POWERS ACT

As you describe your legislation [Senate bill S. 2], it sounds to me as though it would be a significant improvement, obviously, in terms of the current situation.

We are always going to be faced with the problem that presidents have a tendency to view the notion that Congress can impose by statute a limitation upon their capacity to carry out their constitutional responsibilities as commander in chief is not acceptable.

And that is why, of course, President Nixon vetoed the original legislation and why every president since has deemed it unconstitutional. And we have never resolved that conflict. But certainly it is an area where I hope we can do some work in the months ahead. And perhaps the legislation you have suggested would be a good starting point at least for some conversations and discussions.

APPENDIX 2: BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF REPRESENTATIVE CHENEY PROVIDED BY THE NOMINEE

Congressman Dick Cheney of Wyoming

Dick Cheney was born January 30, 1941, in Lincoln, Nebraska, and moved to Casper, Wyoming, at a young age with his parents, Richard H. and Marjorie Cheney.

He attended elementary schools in Casper, graduated in 1959 from Natrona County High School, and earned B.A. and M.A. degrees in political science from the University of Wyoming in 1965 and 1966. He was a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Wisconsin in 1968.

Cheney married Lynne Vincent of Casper on August 29, 1964. They have two daughters—Elizabeth, born July 28, 1966, and Mary, born March 14, 1969.

PUBLIC SERVICE

Cheney began his public service in 1965, when he served as an intern in the Wyoming State Legislature in Cheyenne. In 1966 he was selected by the National Center for Education in Politics to intern on the staff of Warren Knowles, then governor of Wisconsin. In 1968, the American Political Science Association selected him for its Joseph E. Davies Congressional Fellowship, which he served as an assistant to the late Congressman William A. Steiger, R-Wisconsin.

In May 1969, following his Steiger fellowship, Cheney began several years of federal service under Presidents Nixon and Ford. From May 1969, to December 1970, he was Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. From December 1970, to September 1971, he served as Deputy to Donald Rumsfeld, the White House Presidential Counsellor. And from September 1971 to March 1973, he was Assistant Director for Operations of the Cost of Living Council.

In March 1973, Cheney left government service to become Vice President of Bradley, Woods and Company, Inc., an investment advisory firm.

In August 1974, when Gerald R. Ford assumed the presidency, Cheney served on the Ford transition team and, beginning in September, as a Deputy Assistant to the President. In November 1975, he was named Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff, a position he held through the remainder of the Ford Administration, until January 1977. In 1976, Cheney was named by the U.S. Jaycees as one of the ten outstanding young men in America.

He returned to his home state of Wyoming in May 1977 to resume investment banking activities. Cheney was elected to Con-

gress in November 1978. He was reelected in 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1988.

For the 1981–82 Congress, he was chosen by his Republican colleagues to serve as Chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee, becoming one of the few members ever elected to a leadership position after only one term in office. He was re-elected to the Policy Committee Chairmanship for the 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses.

In June 1987, he was unanimously elected Chairman of the House Republican Conference, which functions as the party's caucus and provides information to its members on pending legislation. The Conference Chairman is the third-ranking House GOP leader.

In December, 1988 he was unanimously elected House Republican Whip for the 101st Congress, the second-ranking Republican leadership position. The whip is responsible for polling Republican members on pending legislation, keeping them informed of the agenda on the House floor, and acting as Republican leader whenever the House minority leader is absent.

Cheney is a member of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, where he serves on two subcommittees—National Parks and Public Lands, and Water and Power Resources. He is also a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, serving as ranking Republican on its Subcommittee on Program and Budget Authorization. He was ranking Republican on the 15-member House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Deals with Iran.

APPENDIX 3: LETTER FROM ALLAN M. ROSS, M.D., CONCERNING REPRESENTATIVE CHENEY'S MEDICAL CONDITION

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,
THE H.B. BURNS MEMORIAL BUILDING,
Washington, DC, March 14, 1989.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR NUNN: Congressman Richard Cheney, who has been under my care since September 1985, underwent coronary bypass surgery in the summer of 1988, not for the most common indicator of modifying a poor longevity prognosis (since that prognosis based upon angiographic coronary anatomy was not alarming), but more so in order for him to more safely engage in his rather vigorous lifestyle (including high altitude downhill skiing, backpacking, etc). His recovery has been excellent and he has been advised to pursue unrestricted professional and recreational objectives. Furthermore, his formerly significant high cholesterol levels have been completely reversed on medical therapy. His pharmacological regimen is free of any side effects that would affect his judgement or behavior.

The Congressman is presently fit to accept any position requiring the highest intellectual behavior and physical performance.

Sincerely,

ALLAN M. ROSS, M.D.,
Professor of Medicine,
Director, Division of Cardiology.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR MALCOLM WALLOP

I cannot find the right words to express my enthusiasm for the President's nomination of Dick Cheney to be Secretary of Defense. It is a moment of great celebration for the nation, and one not without some sentimentality on my part. Congressman Cheney will be leaving a Congressional delegation which has labored together closely for some ten years. While this represents some loss to the State of Wyoming, it also represents a great benefit to the Nation and in turn does our great State proud.

I have fished with Dick. I have campaigned with Dick. I have labored with him on issues of national moment and on issues of purely Wyoming interest. I know him as both friend and colleague. In my long experience with him, I have learned that he is above all an able, tough and shrewd executive and legislator. In matters of great national importance, I came to know him as open-minded and fair, and as a man who is able to know what he does not know, and able to recognize and discover where to go to find out.

He brings to this monumental task before him a sense of humility and a sense of presence that shall serve him, and America, well. He is a studious man. Even though he is an undisputed expert on many questions, he still continues to study, to expand his horizons of knowledge. Although a modest man by nature he possesses that peculiar Western talent and ability to be both confident and self-deprecating.

Finally, he brings to this high office one more trait that I admire greatly: a sense of historical perspective. As executive, as policy-maker, and as legislator, he has always demonstrated that in order to move the world forward toward the lofty goals all Americans share, it is absolutely essential to understand where we have been and the constraints that history places on us.

This is a big loss to Wyoming and to its Congressional delegation, as well as to the House Republicans. But it is a big gain for America. And in that gain for America it is, as well, a big gain for Wyoming and to the President of the United States. I am proud to see one of Wyoming's finest ascend to this distinguished office. And I am proud that it is Dick Cheney, my friend, who has been so honored. God give him the strength, the wisdom, and the vision to meet the challenges of the future as he has always met those of the past.

MALCOLM WALLOP.

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